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I. INTRODUCTION
From colonial America up through the twentieth century, judicial
decisionmaking was the hallmark of this country's criminal sentencing
system. In 1984, however, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act
and transferred much of the sentencing authority that previously rested
with the judiciary to the United States Sentencing Commission and
United States Attorneys. This new commission was charged with the
task of creating a sentencing system which would solve the unpredict-
ability and disparity in sentencing that had plagued our criminal sen-
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tencing system. The effect of this sentencing reform on federal sen-
tencing is the focus of this article.
Part II of this Article discusses the history of sentencing in the
United States, and the progression toward indeterminate sentencing.
Part III of this Article focuses on the practical impact of the sentenc-
ing guidelines on the federal criminal justice system and suggests that
the sentencing guidelines have not solved the unpredictability and dis-
parity problems of pre-guideline sentencing, but have provided the
prosecutor with almost complete control over sentencing. Finally, Part
IV examines the constitutional questions that still remain concerning
the sentencing guidelines.
II. HISTORY OF SENTENCING IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Rigid Sentencing of Colonial America
At the core of the early colonial approach to sentencing was the
"prevailing belief in the basic depravity of all human beings, a feeling
that made any notion of an offender's possible rehabilitation absurd."'
Thus, colonial law enforcement swiftly attacked criminal behavior with
public and often harsh punishment designed to maximize a sense of
disgrace to the offender.' The Capital Laws of New England, for ex-
ample, prescribed the death penalty for twelve offenses including
witchcraft, assault in sudden anger, and adultery.' Eventually, however,
the "demoralizing influence both upon the community and the convict
of these public manifestations of disgrace was soon realized, and led,
shortly after the adoption of our Constitution, to their discontinuance in
Pennsylvania" and throughout the colonies.4
This reform in colonial sentencing can be attributed in part to the
1764 work by the Italian, Cesare Beccaria, entitled On Crimes And
1. ARTLuR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING 9 (1978).
2. During this time, the criminal codes were incomplete and judges were provided
with little direction concerning choice of punishment.
3. SANDRA SHANE-DuBOW ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES:
HISTORY, CONTENT AND EFFECT 2 (1985). Early colonial sentencing was prescribed by colo-
nial laws and provided the sentencing judge with very little or no sentencing discretion.
4. United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 449 (1922).
[Vol. 97:373
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Punishments.' Beccaria called for the creation of legislatively deter-
mined sentences, the establishment of a clear criminal code, the restric-
tion of pre-trial detention, the need to base a finding of guilt on cer-
tainty rather than a mere preponderance of the evidence, and the open
administration of the accusation and prosecution of criminal matters
before a jury.6 Beccaria also demanded the elimination of torture and
the abolishment of capital punishment.7 Beccaria's work was based on
the theory prevailing at the time that "the certainty of punishment,
even if it be moderate, will always make a stronger impression than
the fear of another which is more terrible but combined with the hope
of impunity."8
Beccaria's reform movement eventually reached the American
colonies. John Adams quoted from Beccaria's work during his defense
of the British troops on trial in 1770 for their actions in the Boston
Massacre.9 In addition, the United States Constitution's guarantees of a
fair, open and speedy trial, the presumption of innocence, and the
proscriptions of cruel or unusual punishment can be attributed, in part,
to Beccaria's work.1"
In late eighteenth-century America, imprisonment of the offendei,
as a means of encouraging spiritual rehabilitation, was substituted for
the practice of inflicting physical pain as punishment. The belief spread
throughout the new American states "that if, instead of being 'pun-
ished,' the offender were incarcerated and subjected to a rigorous sys-
tem of labor and religion he or she would become 'cured' of criminal
tendencies."" In 1787, the prominent Quaker Benjamin Rush outlined
his proposals for a "House of Reform," where criminals could be kept
5. CESARE BECCARiA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963)
(1764).
6. SHANE-DUBOW, supra note 3, at 1-2.
7. Id. ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS was severely criticized by the ruling powers of
the late eighteenth century. In 1776, the Catholic Church placed the work on its list of
condemned books. Despite this criticism, however, Beccaria's ideas slowly spread throughout
Europe. Id.
8. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 10.
9. SHANE-DuBow, supra note 3, at 2.
10. Id.
11. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 10-11.
1995]
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from society and amend their deviant ways." In 1790, Pennsylvania
adopted Rush's ideas of a "House of Reform" or "penitentiary," as the
Quakers called it. Inmates were sentenced to the penitentiary for fixed
terms, but did not know the length of their terms." This fact is sup-
ported by Rush's push for indeterminate sentencing in 1793:
The duration of punishments, for all crimes, should be limited: but let this
limitation be unknown. I believe this secret to be of the utmost importance
in reforming criminals and preventing crimes. The imagination, when agi-
tated with uncertainty, will seldom fail of connecting the longest duration
of punishment with the smallest crime. 4
B. Toward Indeterminate Sentencing
The growing population of the new nation, its immigrant and tran-
sient composition, the increased efficiency of the police and courts, the
fixed sentence, and other factors all contributed to the rapidly increas-
ing number of inmates, and resulted in overcrowded prisons. 5 To re-
lieve the overcrowding and to make room for new inmates, the use of
pardons became widespread. For example, the young state of Ohio
"simply pardoned convicts whenever the population rose above 120 in
number." 6 Problems with the pardon system, however, including brib-
ery and extortion, led New York to adopt the nation's first "good
time" computation law in 1817. The good time proposal was quickly
adopted by the majority of states. 7
Another means of controlling prison population and pursuing goals
of rehabilitation, as well as allowing more lenient punishments to those
persons who did not appear to present any threat to society, developed
during the nineteenth century and became known as the "suspended
sentence" or probation. 8 The practice of probation in the United
12. SHANE-DuBow, supra note 3, at 3.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citation omitted).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
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States originated with the work of John Augustus, who in 1841 began
to post bonds for persons standing before the Boston courts.19 In time,
as he became trusted by the Boston courts, Augustus was permitted to
"post a bail to postpone sentencing" of the offender and "then later
return to the courts and comment on the individuals' adjustment to the
regime established by Augustus."2 Thus, probation evolved.
Massachusetts first formally authorized the use of probation in
1878.21 The spread of probation to other states was restrained, howev-
er, because "it was thought that the courts lacked authority to impose a
suspended sentence without specific legislative authority."22 In 1894,
the New York Court of Appeals addressed this issue in People ex rel.
Forsyth v. Court of Sessions of Monroe County.' The New York
court ruled that the power to suspend a sentence after conviction is
inherent in every court having criminal jurisdiction and that the sus-
pension power was distinct from the power to pardon.24 Thereafter,
other courts endorsed probation and by 1954, forty-seven of the forty-
eight states had done so.2
C. Indeterminate Sentencing
The use of pardons, good time, probation and later parole all con-
tributed to the growing indeterminacy of sentences rendered by judges
of the nineteenth century, vastly different from the rigid sentencing of
early colonial America.26 Each of these practices affected the time
served under a sentence by altering the fixed term handed down by the
judge at sentencing. These practices led to a refocusing of the sentenc-
ing approach toward what is now called "indeterminate sentencing."
Under this approach, judges were not only encouraged to weigh the




22. SHANE-DuBmOW, supra note 3, at 5.
23. 141 N.Y. 288 (1894).
24. Id. at 294-95.
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when the offender was sentenced to prison, correctional officers were
given the ultimate authority to determine when the offender was suffi-
ciently rehabilitated to merit release or parole.27 The judge's role un-
der indeterminate sentencing was "to bring to bear his accumulated
experience, judgment, and, hopefully, wisdom, in order to determine
what punishment was appropriate for the offense and the offender, con-
victed after a trial with well defined rules of evidence and procedure
or after a plea of guilty."'28 Thus, judicial decisionmaking remained
the hallmark of our system of justice under this new sentencing sys-
tem.
In 1870, New York became the first state to utilize an indetermi-
nate-sentencing system.29 By 1922, all but four states .and the federal
government employed some type of indeterminate sentencing or used
the-parole system which functioned in the same way." By the 1960s,
every state had an indeterminate-sentencing structure or some variation.
D. Twentieth-Century Federal Indeterminate Sentencing
Though Congress had the power to determine the length of federal
sentences and how they would be served,3' it abdicated its authority
over sentencing to the judiciary. Congress imposed few requirements
upon the judiciary with respect to sentencing.32 Instead, courts were
freely permitted to pick a sentence within a range of punishment.3
Congress' abdication became more pronounced with the establishment
of the United States Parole Commission in 1910, which became part of
the Executive Branch and was responsible for determining the actual
27. CAMPBELL, supra note 1, at 11.
28. United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (D.D.C. 1989).
29. CAWBELL, supra note 1, at 12.
30. Id at 13 n.75 (citing FAiR AND CERTAiN PuNIsHmENT 95 (1976)).
31. United States v. Wilberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820). Judicial discretion is
also subject to Congressional control. See Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
32. "[Indeterminate sentencing] obviously required the judge and the parole officer to
make their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own assessments of the
offender's amendability to rehabilitation. As a result, the court and the officer were in posi-
tions to exercise, and usually did exercise, very broad discretion." Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
33. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978).
[V/ol. 97:373
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duration of imprisonment.34 Incremental steps were taken by Congress
to gain some control over sentencing with the enactment of some man-
datory minimum sentences35 and the use of consecutive sentences.36
However, the essence of sentencing remained in the hands of the dis-
trict court to determine a sentence within a given range. The judge's
discretion was almost unreviewable in this regard.
The late 1970s became the era of judges known as "turn 'em
loose Bruce" and "hang 'em high Harry." Wide sentencing disparities
were found to exist for the same crime among what were believed to
be similarly-situated defendants in different jurisdictions. 7 Some judg-
es thought it was their role to rehabilitate, while others believed their
role was to punish. Pure punishment was certainly the easier (not to
mention being politically popular) and more expedient method of han-
dling individuals whom society considered to be unfit to live amongst
them. However, punishment, and not rehabilitation, was to be the
primary goal, and the Parole Commission, which had the responsibility
of determining when convicts were "rehabilitated" and ready to be
inserted back into society, had little or no role in the sentencing sys-
tem.
39
After years of study, discussion, and no doubt the movement of
political forces, Congress determined that the sentencing system needed
more than mere incremental changes, and that the entire system should
34. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). See also Geraghty v. Unit-
ed States Parole Comm'n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103
(1984).
35. Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1703, 104 Stat. 4926 (1994).
36. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Supp. V 1993) (five years added to any punishment
for the underlying offense); 18 U.S.C. § 656 (Supp. V 1993) (bank embezzlement offenses
increased from five years to twenty years in 1989).
37. See studies cited in the 1983 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, S. REP. No. 225,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-49 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
38. Rehabilitation was not a popular goal. N. MoRRIs, THE FUTURE OF IwRiSONmENT
24-43 (1974); F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); D. LIPTON ET AL., EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT:
A SURVEY OF TREATmENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975), in S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 40 n.16 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
39. For a discussion regarding the Parole Commission Sentencing Review, see United
States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1979). See also Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
1995]
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be rebuilt.4" While Congress would seemingly have been satisfied with
judges who gave predictably harsh and certain sentences to violent
offenders, and simply force the more lenient judges to give harsher
sentences, that was not the case. Years of frustration with criminal
sentencing culminated in 1984 when rehabilitation as a primary purpose
in sentencing was cast aside, and Congress passed the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984 (SRA),4' transferring much of the authority that
previously rested with the judiciary to a new entity, the United States
Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Comission).
Under the SRA, the stated objectives of sentencing required the
sentence imposed to: (1) reflect the seriousness of the offense, to pro-
mote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the of-
fense; (2) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective man-
ner.42 The SRA also established the Sentencing Commission as part of
the Judicial Branch and charged it with the herculean task of creating a
sentencing system which would solve the perceived problems of unwar-
ranted disparity of sentences and the lack of certainty in sentencing,
and providing true punishment consistent with the intent of Con-
gress.43 To make sure that the Sentencing Commission took its task
seriously, Congress made the Guidelines compulsory,4 abolished pa-
role, and refused, in the interest of keeping with their goals, to give
sentencing judges more discretion.45
40. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, 41-46 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
41. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (1988).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)-(b) (1988).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
45. 133 CONG. REc. S16,644-48 (Nov. 20, 1987). It is doubtful that Congress fully
anticipated the effect of the SRA since it became effective November 1, 1987. See, e.g.,
1993 UNIT=D STATES SENTENCING COMMISSiON ANNUAL REPORT 182. There were more
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It is important to recognize why Congress established the Sentenc-
ing Commission, and through it, the Sentencing Guidelines. The prob-
lems which led to Congress' action included the scope of judicial dis-
cretion, the disparity of sentencing, lack of certainty in sentencing, and
the past emphasis on rehabilitation instead of punishment. Congress
simply made the decision that the sentencing pendulum had swung too
far in the direction of the judges and that it needed to swing back
toward the center. However, now that the Sentencing Guidelines have
been in operation for over seven years, the argument can and has been
made that Congress' action has forced the pendulum too far in the
opposite direction. Indeed, a fair analysis would indicate that the prob-
lems intrinsic in pre-SRA sentencing remain, and may, in fact, even be
worse.
46
While Congress may not be fully aware of the effect of SRA, it is
not because there haven't been complaints.47 However, Congress has
not been moved enough by the criticism to take effective action. Con-
gress has allowed actions of the Sentencing Commission to take effect
by taking no affirmative action, thereby allowing the Sentencing Com-
mission to run the sentencing show. 4 While there is nothing inherent-
ly wrong with Congress' intent when it enacted the SRA, the question
remains whether the sweeping changes that the SRA made in 1984, in
fact, do what Congress intended.
46. See discussion infra Part Hm.
47. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrITEE (Apr. 2, 1990); UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES, CENTRAL QUESTIONS REMAiN UNANSWERED (Aug. 1992).
Numerous commentators have also made their feelings known. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Dis-
cretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of
Guidelines at Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CalM. L. REV. 161 (1991). Contra
William W. Wilkins, Jr., Response to Judge Heaney, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 795 (1992). It
should be noted that Judge Wilkins is a United States Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Chair of the Sentencing Commission. Judge Heaney is the Senior
Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
48. The SRA, at 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988), provides that Guidelines promulgated by
the Sentencing Commission take effect 180 days after their submission to Congress.
1995]
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III. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The sentencing world in the federal criminal system - as its par-
ticipants knew it - came to an end on November 1, 1987. Much of
the substantial. power held by federal judges prior to that date simply
vanished. The Sentencing Commission and prosecutors became the
newly empowered, sentencing hearings became mini-trials, and pub-
lishers of legal materials had another opportunity to publish volumes
upon volumes of material as a result of Congress' actions. Initially,
any legal obstacles placed in the path of the SRA were swept away by
the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mistretta.49 Mistretta
declared the enactment of the SRA and Congress' empowerment of the
Sentencing Commission constitutional." Numerous attempts have been
made to have the new sentencing schemes declared unconstitutional
without significant success."
Though constitutional questions remain,52 the Sentencing Guide-
lines must also be analyzed from a real-world, practical aspect to deter-
mine whether or not they are effectively treating the problems that
concerned Congress. Unreviewable discretion by the sentencing judge
and the unpredictability of the ultimate sentence were of primary con-
cern to Congress prior to the Sentencing Guidelines. The actual appli-
cation of the Guidelines, however, reveals that unreviewable discretion
and unpredictable sentencing remain. The Sentencing Guidelines have
merely changed the culprits: the uncontrolled discretion and unpredict-
49. 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989).
50. Mistretta re-enforced the notion that Congress had the authority to determine how
sentences were to be imposed for criminal violations of the law. Further, the Supreme Court
found that Congress did not improperly delegate its authority to the Commission, and that
such delegation to the Judicial Branch was not a violation of separation of powers. Interest-
ingly, only passing dicta was made about the delegation of power to the Executive Branch
through its prosecutors and its effect on the separation of powers.
51. Multiple due process and other constitutional challenges have been made to the
Guidelines as a whole and in part. See, e.g., United States v. Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203, 206
(5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 1773 (1992); United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143,
144-45 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Mondello, 927 F.2d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991).
Mistretta effectively legitimized the new sentencing scheme.
52. See discussion infra Part IV.
[Vol. 97:373
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ability of the prosecutors, not the judges, are now the causes for con-
cern.
53
The Sentencing Guidelines have changed the way prosecutors oper-
ate at both the beginning and end of the prosecution. Prosecutors can
now determine what the sentence will be or what they want it to be
prior to indictment: prosecutors know what specific facts will increase
sentences and which ones will decrease sentences; they know that they
can criminally charge the best or most minimal portion of their case
and nonetheless gain the benefit of the weak or biggest part of their
case through sentencing proceedings; they know in advance the proof
that their investigators need to substantiate the sentence; and, they
know that constitutional obligations imposed upon them are not nearly
as strong at sentencing as they are in prior phases of the process. 4
Most importantly, the prosecutor's power is enhanced in light of the
mere preponderance of evidence standard imposed upon the prosecutor
for sentencing issues.55
Federal judges, perhaps first taken by surprise by the practical
effects of the Sentencing Guidelines, did not take long to note in opin-
ions and commentary the shift in power from their offices to the U. S.
Attorneys' offices across the country. 6 Perhaps the frustration of fed-
53. Professor Alschuler predicted this result in 1978:
Eliminating or restricting the discretionary powers of parole boards and trial judges
is likely to increase the powers of prosecutors, and these powers are likely to be
exercised without effective limits through the practice of plea bargaining. The sub-
stitution of fixed or presumptive sentences for the discretion of judges and parole
boards tends to concentrate sentencing power in the hands of officials who are
likely to allow their decisions to be governed by factors irrelevant to the proper
goals of sentencing - officials moreover, who typically lack the information, ob-
jectivity and experience of trial judges ....
Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for
"Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 577 (1978).
54. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing. See FED. R. EVID.
1101(d)(3).
55. It should be clear that while the probation office is intended to act independently
on behalf of the court, the reality is that probation offices have neither the resources nor
the training to conduct independent investigations prior to sentencing, and rely upon Assis-
tant United States Attorneys to provide sentencing information.
56. See, e.g., Heaney, supra note 47, at 190; United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp.
632, 637-38 (E.D. Wash. 1990); United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (D.D.C.
1995]
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eral judges in seeing their authority being stripped away by the Sen-
tencing Guidelines is best illustrated by the opinion of Judge
McNichols from the Eastern District of Washington:
Congress has thus shifted discretion from persons who have demonstrated
essential qualifications to the satisfaction of their peers, various investigato-
ry agencies, and the United States Senate to persons who may be barely
out of law school with scant life experience and whose common sense
may be an unproven asset.57
Although Judge McNichols statement might not represent the feel-
ings of federal judges generally, the transfer of discretion to the prose-
cuting authorities by the Sentencing Guidelines is indisputable. The
Sentencing Guidelines permit prosecutors to help determine the sen-
tence in very specific ways. This new power supplements their pre-
existing power to coordinate investigations, conduct grand jury proceed-
ings, draft indictments, determine charges to be filed and where they
should be filed, and decide whether or not to plea bargain and the
terms thereof. Federal prosecutors have turned into the 800-pound go-
rilla of the criminal process in federal courts. A review of some of the
specific provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines clearly demonstrates
the considerable power of the prosecutor.
A. Relevant Conduct
Perhaps nowhere in the Sentencing Guidelines is the discretion of
the prosecutor, and the opportunity to abuse that discretion, more visi-
ble than in Section 1Bl.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, innocently
entitled "Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline
Range)."58 Prior to the existence of the Sentencing Guidelines, rele-
1989), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States
v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119-21 (3d Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring); United States
v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1332-33 (6th Cir. 1990).
57. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. at 637 (citations omitted).
58. Specifically, Section 1B1.3 provides:
(a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless otherwise
specified, (i) the base offense level where the guideline specifies more than one
base offense level, (ii) specific offense characteristics and (iii) cross references in
Chapter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be determined on the
[Vol. 97:373384
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vant information regarding the defendant's conduct outside the conduct
directly leading to the conviction was always relevant.59 However,
with the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines, relevant conduct has
a much more direct and substantial impact on the defendant's length of
imprisonment. Though usually shocking to the uninitiated, relevant
conduct is now regularly used to significantly enhance sentences and
has been a rallying cry for those who believe prosecutors have been
awarded too much power by the Sentencing Commission, since it is
the prosecutor who has the discretion in most instances to offer rele-
vant conduct and how much of it to in fact offer.
It is perhaps easiest to explain the impact of relevant conduct by
way of example. Defendant John Doe was indicted and subsequently
convicted pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)6" for possession with in-
basis of the following:
(1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, com-
manded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal
plan, others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foresee-
able acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of con-
viction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to
avoid detection or responsibility for that offense;
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would
require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivi-
sions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsections
(a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and
omissions; and
(4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline.
(b) Chapters Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood) and Five (Determin-
ing the Sentence). Factors in Chapters Four and Five that establish the guideline
range shall be determined on the basis of the conduct and information specified in
the respective guidelines.
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 1BI.3 (Nov. 1993).
59. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
60. Section 841(a)(1) provides:
(a) Except as authorized by this sub-chapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally -
(I) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufac-
ture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or . ...
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988).
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tent to distribute four grams of cocaine base (crack cocaine)." The
Government's evidence was relatively simple. A confidential informant
recorded the defendant's sale of four grams of crack cocaine. The
crack is recovered, the tape is transcribed, the indictment is returned,
and defendant Doe is quickly convicted by a jury of his peers.
Pursuant to Sentencing Guideline Section 2D1.1, a conviction in-
volving four grams of crack cocaine calls for a Level 24, or fifty-one
to sixty-three months imprisonment." Now let's assume that the As-
sistant United States Attorney who prosecuted defendant Doe learns
from his drug investigators that they know several of Doe's "friends"
who were involved in the drug trade (before or after conviction). Wit-
nesses Brown, White, and Green are debriefed, but are reluctant to
share what they know about defendant Doe until they themselves are
assured of immunity or a substantially reduced charge. The prosecutor
concludes that the request is a reasonable one and gives each of them
immunity to provide information on defendant Doe. 3 Not surprisingly,
witnesses Brown, White, and Green reveal that they have worked with
defendant Doe selling cocaine base in amounts significantly above the
four grams for which he was indicted and subsequently convicted of
selling. In fact, they approximate that the defendant Doe has been in-
volved in the sale of two kilograms of crack cocaine.
This new found information is then supplied to the probation offi-
cer who is responsible for the pre-sentencing investigation on defendant
Doe's four-gram, crack cocaine conviction. The probation officer
throws away all previous calculations based upon the now proven
charge in light of Sentencing Guideline Section 1Bl.3(a)(2) regarding
61. A drug distribution example is being used because drug distribution, particularly
incidents involving cocaine base, is the area of criminal law that has been most prominent
on the federal level in recent years. However, relevant conduct analysis is appropriate for
any of the crimes set forth in the United States Code which are considered by the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.
62. Criminal history is assumed to be none.
63. The granting of immunity was, of course, preceded by a "proffer" so the prosecu-
tor could hear in advance what it is he would be getting in return for the immunity. It
becomes quite clear to the witnesses that unless they have substantial information, or will
provide substantial information about defendant Doe, there will be no immunity. Being up-
right and trustworthy drug dealers, it is easy to learn rules of the game.
[Vol. 97:373
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the defendant's now obvious course of conduct. He includes this new
found relevant conduct in his sentencing report, which is reviewed by
defense counsel and the defendant. Obviously, defendant Doe disputes
the statements of his "friends," but has no way of. disproving their
statements. The court hears the undisputed evidence at the sentencing
hearing, including any hearsay evidence.64 Though the character of the
witnesses is definitely questionable, the judge finds their testimony to
have a "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accura-
cy." 65 Hence, the judge is forced to add the relevant conduct to the
conduct defendant Doe already stands convicted of, increasing his Sen-
tencing Guidelines level from twenty-four to thirty-eight, 6 and in-
creasing his minimum imprisonment exposure from 4.25 years to 19.5
years.
The addition of the relevant conduct is mandatory - the judge
must add it if it is supported.67 When there is no contradictory evi-
dence and the only questionable aspect of the testimony are the prom-
ises that have been received from the Government, the judge would
indeed struggle to adequately explain to the appellate court why he
ignored testimony of three other witnesses at the sentencing hearing
regarding relevant conduct.
While the above example is more extreme than the typical variety
of relevant conduct scenario, it is an example of the type of situation
that can, and has visited itself upon other defendant Does. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Ebbole,68 the defendant plead guilty to distrib-
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1).
65. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 6A1.3, cmt. (Nov.
1993) (citing United States v. Marshall, 519 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Wis. 1981), aff'd, 719 F.2d
887 (7th Cir. 1983)); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
66. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2Dl.1 (Nov. 1993).
67. See United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495, 1501 (7th Cir. 1990).
68. 917 F.2d 1495 (7th Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Sleet, 893 F.2d 947,
947-48 (8th Cir. 1990) (26.87 grams cocaine up to 396.4 grams); United States v. Miller,
910 F.2d 1321, 1323 (6th Cir. 1990).
It should be noted that relevant conduct is only one of the methods that can be
used to dramatically increase sentences. A conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988)
permits additional drug quantities to be added after conviction when they are proven to be
part of the conspiracy. Relevant conduct under Sentencing Guideline Section 1B1.3 enhances
19951
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uting one gram of cocaine which subjected him to a term of imprison-
ment of twenty-seven to thirty-three months (criminal history of IV).69
Post conviction information supplied by the prosecutor was included in
the probation report and increased the total amount of drugs attribut-
able to the defendant to 1.7 kilograms. Correspondingly, his sentence
range increased to 92-115 months, more than three times the original
range.7" After noting the unfairness of this practice, the court conclud-
ed that the increase was not only permissible, but mandatory, under the
relevant conduct provisions of the sentencing guidelines.7'
Among the citizenry, the fact that drug dealers are being dealt
with harshly is not a concern. However, the legal question remains as
to whether this scenario is consistent with Congress' intended sentenc-
ing reform and whether it is fair and protects defendants from over-
zealous prosecutors." With the relevant conduct provisions, the prose-
cutor can decide in advance how much conduct he will attribute to a
given defendant at sentencing, vis-a-vis the conduct he writes into the
indictment or proves at trial. There is surely, if nothing else, an incen-
tive to indict and try the easiest charge, and save the remaining charg-
es for sentencing where there is a lower standard of proof, lower stan-
dards of admissibility, and few of the obligations to a defendant that
a sentence based upon uncharged conduct, while additional drugs in a conspiracy is an en-
hancement of charged conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520,
1522 (9th Cir. 1992) (Evidence at trial proved defendant's involvement in drug conspiracy
involving sixty-seven grams of cocaine, but defendant was sentenced to conspiracy with
respect to fifteen kilograms. His sentence moved from a minimum of forty-one months to
292 months. The additional evidence was obtained by the United States Attorney's office
after conviction.).
69. Ebbole, 917 F.2d at 1495-96.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1496, 1501. Courts have not had much of a problem in rejecting arguments
which question the relevant conduct concept. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 939
F.2d 135, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Schaper, 903 F.2d 891, 896-97 (2d Cir.
1990). Moreover, it is considered quite acceptable to consider dismissed or acquitted conduct
at the underlying criminal trial as part of the relevant conduct because there is a lesser
burden of proof at the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 895 F.2d
867, 877 (2d Cir. 1990). This effectively convicts the defendant of the conduct and propor-
tionately increases the sentence.
72. It should be noted that the authors have worked with a number of prosecutors in
the Southern District of West Virginia, and have found each of them to be professional and
not of the type that have abused the Guidelines.
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are owed prior to the actual trial.73 The sentencing, with sufficient
relevant conduct, can accomplish the same result as being convicted on
several substantive charges. The decision with respect to relevant con-
duct, and whether to even raise it at sentencing at all, is solely within
the discretion of the prosecutor, usually decided in his office, and is
therefore unreviewable. Factors that may help determine the extent of
relevant conduct include reliability of evidence, desire to help the
court's consistency in sentencing, desire to comply with an unwritten
and unspoken agreement with defense counsel, agreement not to offer
relevant conduct because of some promise of cooperation by the defen-
dant, or for any other reason or non-reason to use relevant conduct.
Thus, the prosecutor controls the treatment of the defendant at sentenc-
ing to a large degree.
While relevant conduct is a very effective way for the prosecutor
to help determine the defendant's sentence, the prosecutor may also
have the option of seeking "departures" under the Sentencing Guide-
lines which makes the defendant that much more dependent on the
prosecutor's discretion.
B. Departures
Similar to the dependency a defendant has upon the prosecutor
with regard to relevant conduct, a type of dependency also exists in
the area of "departures."74 Departure is the term used to describe the
imposition of a sentence outside the Sentencing Guidelines range.
Unlike relevant conduct, a departure can be subject to more con-
trol by judges and defense attorneys to the extent they can also seek
departures based upon evidence." However, the availability of depar-
tures to judges and defense attorneys does not diminish the ability of
73. Ebbole, 917 F.2d at 1501; United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1332 (6th Cir.
1990) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting).
74. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 5KI.1 et seq.
(Nov. 1993).
75. Defense attorneys have such options as Lesser Harms (§ 5K2.11), Coercion and
Duress (§ 5K2.12), and Diminished Capacity (§ 5K2.13). Similarly, courts may also decide
a departure is appropriate because of special factors such as Extreme Conduct (§ 5K2.8) and
the Disruption of Governmental Functions (§ 51(2.7).
1995]
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the prosecutor to seek enhancement of the defendant's sentence76 up-
ward or wield the availability of a downward departure for "substantial
assistance" as a club upon the defendant with no reviewability of the
prosecutor's actions.
Only upon the motion of the prosecutor can the court "depart"
from the Sentencing Guidelines when the defendant has provided "sub-
stantial assistance" in the investigation or prosecution of others." The
significant effect of a substantial-assistance motion is illustrated by the
following example. Where the calculations for a defendant call for a
120-month imprisonment sentence, a properly framed motion for sub-
stantial assistance from the Government permits the court to sentence
the defendant to twenty-four months. Though the prosecutor must make
the motion, the court determines the reduction in sentence on the
grounds set forth by the Sentencing Commission.78 The court may
not, either on its own or on a defense motion, depart from the Sen-
tencing Guidelines because it perceives substantial assistance to have
taken place.79 Moreover, the district judge has no right to expect or
request an explanation from the prosecutor when there is no substan-
tial-assistance motion when the judge feels it may be justified.80 Pros-
ecutors have almost unlimited discretion to make a motion and thereby
alter the sentence.8'
76. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir. 1990), discussed
infra.
77. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 5KI.1 (Nov. 1994).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1991); United States
v. Agu, 949 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 267 (4th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1034-35 (6th Cir. 1990).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 929 F.2d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1991).
81. While the Government's discretion with substantial assistance motions has not been
found to violate due process, United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1018 (1st Cir.
1990), the judge does have authority to review the refusal to grant or file a substantial-
assistance motion if the Government's refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive.
Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1844 (1992). Arguments that a judge has more
authority to consider a motion for substantial assistance without a Government motion have
received some sympathy. See United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir. 1989);
United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1989). However, the vast majority of
courts have not agreed.
[Vol. 97:373
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By itself, the fact that the prosecutor has sole discretion to move
for a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines because of cooperation
seems to be nothing more than a prosecutorial club which can and
should be used to help further the administration of justice. However,
Congress' interest in overhauling the sentencing system must not be
forgotten. Prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, there was little or no
predictability in sentencing, too much discretion was given to judges,
and different defendants were treated differently from one district to
another for the same crime. Predictability and equal treatment were
Congress' primary goals. Unfortunately, substantial-assistance motions
have not assisted in reaching these goals. Substantial-assistance motions
have been less than uniformly applied under the same set of standard
guidelines, and thereby continue the pre-guidelines concerns of unequal
treatment and unpredictability. 2
The United States Sentencing Commission recognized this problem
in its 1993 Annual Report 3 when it listed three findings of a long-
term study on substantial assistance:
1. A significant increase from 1989 to 1992 in the national rate of
departure for substantial assistance (from 5.8% to 15.1% of all
cases);
2. A wide variation in the rate of substantial assistance departure
among circuits and districts (from 0.0% to 48.8%); and
3. Considerable variation in the kinds of defendant assistance that
result in substantial assistance motions as well as the extent of
departure granted by the court.
In the Southern District of West Virginia, the percentage of sub-
stantial-assistance departures between October 1, 1992 through Septem-
ber 30, 1993 was only 7.3% (29 of the total 395 sentenced), while the
Northern District's percentage was 11.4%."4 In the Eastern District of
82. Cooperation to one prosecutor may be nothing to another. Information that a given
defendant wishes to share may be important to one prosecutor in one jurisdiction because of
the type of work being done there, and unimportant to the prosecutor in the next district It
should also be noted that notwithstanding crimes for perjury, false swearing, etc., a harsh
Sentencing Guidelines sentence in the drug arena can be ameliorated substantially by having
"knowledge" about fellow drug dealers.
83. 1993 UNtrED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 11.
84. Id. at 161.
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Pennsylvania, it appeared that there were many more cooperating indi-
viduals since prosecutors there filed substantial-assistance motions
50.8% of the time, while in the Western District of Arkansas defen-
dants were obviously less talkative, where a mere .06% motions for
substantial assistance were filed. 5 Is it reasonable to conclude that de-
fendants in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania are truly more assisting
than defendants charged with similar crimes in other locations?"
Probably not. Instead, prosecutors in Pennsylvania obviously had poli-
cies - either individually or as a unit - that the motion would be
made under less demanding scenarios. Ironically, this is just the kind
of disparity in sentencing which caused Congress to enact the SRA.
The discretionary use of substantial-assistance motions by prosecu-
tors has been found to be constitutional. 7 However, the fact that sub-
stantial-assistance departures account for over 70% of all departures8
clearly illustrates the effect of the discretion exercised by the prosecu-
tor.
Substantial-assistance motions are not the only means of altering
sentences. Fourteen specific grounds have been explicitly cited by the
Sentencing Comniission as acceptable reasons for departure. The Sen-
tencing Commission also provides a general statement on departures
which allows a court to go outside the established sentencing range if
the court finds "that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consider-
ation by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described."89
85. Id. at 161-62.
86. It should be noted that a full one-third of the substantial assistance departures
were substantially derived from drug trafficking prosecutions. Id. at 165.
87. See United States v. Saldivar, 730 F. Supp. 329, 330-31 (D. Nev. 1990).
88. 1993 UNrTE STATES SENTENCING CoMMIssIoN ANNUAL REPORT 159.
89. United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines, § 5K2.0 (Nov. 1993)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)). The possible grounds for a departure are fairly narrow.
Many individual factors have been considered by the Sentencing Commission and are n.t
subject to departure. See United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 1990)
(court's finding that defendant was not a threat to society not a ground for departure); Unit-
ed States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 1991) (disparities in co-defendants' sentenc-
es not grounds for departure); United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir. 1991)
(socio-economic status not a ground for departure).
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Many of the factors that are used to determine whether or not a
departure is appropriate are known to the prosecutor and his agents.
Departures are fact intensive. If a departure is sought by the prosecu-
tor, evidence is collected and submitted to the court in a sentencing
hearing for consideration. If for whatever reason the prosecutor does
not wish to seek a departure, the prosecutor just doesn't do so, and
facts known which would already support an upward or downward
departure are ignored.
Perhaps one of the best examples of a prosecutor's use of depar-
tures to increase a sentence above and beyond the offense or convic-
tion is found in United States v. Kikumura." Kikumura was convicted
of a variety of charges related to, among other things, the transporta-
tion of weapons in interstate commerce. The sentence was calculated
pursuant to Sentencing Guideline § 2K1.6. The calculation determined
Kikumura to be a Level 18, exposing him to twenty-seven to thirty-
three months. However, the Government, in a sentencing memorandum,
advised Kikumura that it would seek a substantial upward departure
based on his alleged terroristic activities.9' The Government then pre-
sented witnesses to support the departures sought. The district court
heard the evidence and ruled the upward departure warranted." The
district court sentenced Kikumura to thirty years imprisonment, thereby
constituting a departure of more than twenty-seven years.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals started its analysis of the dis-
trict court's departure by acknowledging that "real offense sentencing"
can create potential and significant unfairness because of the nature of
the collateral, post-verdict adjudication for which the procedural
protections are significantly lower than at the trial itself.93 After con-
sidering each of the reasons that the district court relied upon for de-
parting in such a magnitude, and the clearly erroneous standard it was
90. 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990).
91. Id. at 1094.
92. The court found that Kikumura had formulated the intent to cause multiple deaths
and serious injuries and was involved in a planned detonation of unusually dangerous explo-
sives, an intent to disrupt a governmental function, extreme conduct, endangerment of public
health/safety and national security, and an inadequacy of criminal history category. Id. at
1097.
93. Id. at 1099.
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operating under, the court decided that the district court's upward de-
parture was legal and permissible.94 However, the court found that the
extent of the departure was not reasonable, and the sentence was vacat-
ed so that the district court could modify the sentence accordingly.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn agreed with the court's
holding generally, but noted his concern that the Government had ma-
nipulated Kilcumura's charge and sentencing, thus illustrating that the
Sentencing Guidelines had replaced judicial discretion with prosecutori-
al discretion.95 Judge Rosenn concluded that the original charges were
manipulated in such a way to allow the plea of guilty and then allow
the Government to use a sentencing hearing as a method by which the
punishment desired would be obtained. He noted that the strategy sig-
nificantly lightened the Government's burden at sentencing as it was
not required to furnish Kikumura "with the evidence against him to
assure an informed and able cross-examination," was not burdened with
the Rules of Evidence, and had a significantly lesser burden of proof
than it would have had at trial.96 Judge Rosenn contended that the
Sentencing Guidelines encouraged this strategy, and it was clear that
the Government's primary case against Kikumura was what it put on
during the sentencing hearing, and not what was contained in the in-
dictment. Judge Rosenn's conclusions are supported,97 and other courts
have expressed similar concerns.98
The shift of discretion from the judge to the prosecutor under the
Sentencing Guidelines clearly raises practical concerns about the "tail
wagging the dog." While there can be disagreement about the transfer
of discretion being good or bad, there can be no disagreement that a
savvy prosecutor can effectively sentence the defendant himself after
determining what the sentence should be. But again, this is a practical
94. Id. at 1109 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).
95. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1119 (Rosen, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1120.
97. Judge Rosenn cited a Federal Courts' Study Report which noted: "We have been
told that the rigidity of the Guidelines is causing a massive, though unintended transfer of
discretion of authority from the court to the prosecutor. The prosecutor exercises this discre-
tion outside the system." REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 38 (Apr.
1990).
98. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. at 1372-73; Boshell, 728 F. Supp. at 637.
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problem which must be considered when discussing the Sentencing
Guidelines, vis-a-vis Congress' intent by creating the Sentencing Com-
mission. On a higher plane, the new-found prosecutorial discretion also
has constitutional ramifications.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Though it is routinely cited for the premise that the Sentencing
Guidelines are constitutional, the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Mistretta99 is fairly limited in its constitutional analysis.
Mistretta substantially limited its analysis to the delegation of powers
from Congress to the Commission, which is part of the Judiciary. The
Court also decided that there was no separation-of-powers violation
with the delegation of authority to the Commission. However, several
other constitutional issues were not raised, and therefore, not ruled
upon by the Court.0 They include issues directly related to the
prosecutor's role under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Perhaps no area of constitutional concern has attracted as much
attention as the due process aspect of the Sentencing Guidelines. l0 '
Due process rights of a defendant are in effect at sentencing.' 2 How-
ever, the courts of appeals have routinely rejected due process
challenges.' 3 The primary bases for rejecting those challenges are
found in two pre-Sentencing Guidelines Supreme Court decisions in
McMillan v. Pennsylvania°4 and Williams v. New York," 5 which
99. 488 U.S. 361 (1985).
100. Id. at 391 (raising the possibility of a constitutional problem if power had been
conferred upon the executive branch).
101. Several due process issues have been raised, including those raised in Lauren
Greenwald, Note, Relevant Conduct and the Impact of the Preponderance Standard of Proof
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; A Denial of Due Process, 18 VT. L. REV. 529
n.23, 532-33 (1994). Prosecutorial discretion has also raised due process concerns. See Rob-
erts, 726 F. Supp. at 1367. Relevant conduct is also laden with due process concerns. See
Miller, 910 F.2d at 1330 (Merritt, J. dissenting).
102. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
103. Heaney, "supra note 47, at 212 n.156. (circuit courts rejecting due process claims
that the burden of proof at sentencing is unconstitutional). See, e.g., Roberts, 726 F. Supp.
1359 (D.D.C. 1989), revd sub nom. United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632 (E.D. Wash. 1990), modified, 952 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1991).
104. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). Reliance upon McMillan has been criticized because of the
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appear to permit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion allowed in the
Sentencing Guidelines.
To the extent there have been successful constitutional attacks on
prosecutor's discretion, it has occurred on the fringes. For example, in
United States v. Fortier, 1 6 the prosecutor, in a sentencing hearing,
attempted to add an additional 249 grams of cocaine to the defendant's
conduct through the relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the relevant conduct offered by the Government, although reliable, was
introduced as triple hearsay, without the benefit of witnesses, and
thereby in violation of the confrontation clause." 7
The prosecutor's burden of proof at sentencing has also come
under attack.'08 If the prosecutor is permitted wide-ranging discretion
which effectively allows him to determine sentencing, then the least
that can be done is to hold the prosecutor to a standard of proof more
strict than a preponderance, or in the words of the Sentencing Guide-
lines, "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accura-
cy." '0 9 Most attempts to modify the burden have been rejected based
upon McMillan, which was decided before the actual, practical effect
of the Sentencing Guidelines became apparent. These rejections have
come notwithstanding the fact that sentencing today is much different
than sentencing prior to the Sentencing Guidelines. Sentencing hearings
have become mini-trials (or major trials) involving witnesses, evidence,
and arguments to the court. Sentencing is now open to becoming an
"end run" around the indictment by a savvy prosecutor who does not
advise the defendant what he should expect at sentencing by pleading
McMillan pre-Guideline assumptions. See Heaney, supra note 47, at 213.
105. 337 U.S. 241 (1948).
106. 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1992).
107. Id. at 103-04. See also M. Johnson, Comment, Criminal Constitution Law
Eighth Circuit Applies the Confrontation Clause at a Sentence Hearing - United States v.
Fortier, 911 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1990), 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 829 (1991).
108. See Lauren Greenwald, Note, Relevant Conduct and the Impact of the Preponder-
ance Standard of Proof under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Denial of Due Process,
18 VT. L. REV. 529 (1994).
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guilty or going to trial. This situation is much different than that found
in McMillan and has raised the ire of some federal judges. ' ° Some
courts have taken specific action.
In Kikumura, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals saw
the opportunity to increase the burden of proof for prosecutors in a
fact situation which presented an extreme use of the sentencing mecha-
nism to increase a sentence. In situations where hearsay is substantially
relied upon, and the magnitude of a departure is disproportionate, the
standard of proof should be increased to a clear and convincing stan-
dard.' Kikumura is consistent with Fortier to the extent that the
confrontation clause is cited as the reason behind the imposition of a
higher constitutional standard of proof when facially unreliable facts
form the basis for the sentence enhancement.
Kikumura and Fortier (to a lesser degree) are consistent with the
warnings - warnings which have been fairly well ignored by other
circuit courts of appeal' - that when a sentencing hearing turns in-
to what the trial should have been after a complete indictment was re-
turned, then a higher standard of proof may be constitutionally re-
quired. Other circuits have refused to adopt this reasoning." 3
V. CONCLUSION
History has demonstrated that criminal sentencing has been the
subject of a variety of theories and methods. Fixed or determinate
sentences, indeterminate sentences, or a combination of both, have all
been utilized. Each of the sentencing options have their own problems.
None are perfect. Today's criminal sentencing system evidences traits
of several types of sentencing schemes.
While state legislatures predominantly rely upon indeterminate
sentencing and thereby grant much of the sentencing discretion to judg-
110. Miller, 910 F.2d at 1330-31 (Merritt, J. dissenting); Roberts, 726 F. Supp. at
1367-68; Boshell, 728 F. Supp. at 637-38; Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d at 1527-28 (Wiggins,
J., concurring); Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1119-20 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
111. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1101-02.
112. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88-89 (citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir. 1989).
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es and parole boards, Congress rejected indeterminate sentencing with
the enactment of the SRA. Congress found the discretion previously
exercised by judges and parole commissions inconsistent with its goals
of consistency, fairness and predictability in sentencing. The SRA was
enacted to accomplish these goals.
However, the Sentencing Commission's enactment of the operating
provisions of the new Sentencing Guidelines merely turned the federal
sentencing process into a prosecutor's panacea. A prosecutor can now
direct the investigation, decide who to charge, when to charge, what to
include and not include in the indictment, decide who to negotiate with
and the substance of any plea bargain, grant use immunity, and ma-
neuver the facts and evidence that determine the sentence to a large
degree. The sentence can be harsh or lenient, and the prosecutor deter-
mines which it is. Most importantly, each of these decisions, including
the sentencing decision, are unreviewable because they are not a matter
of record. Only the results of the decisions are reviewable.
Hence, the unbridled discretion of the judiciary that caused Con-
gress to overhaul the federal sentencing system has merely been trans-
ferred in large part to the prosecutors who are just as likely to exercise
it differently from one to another. Disparity remains, creating fertile
ground for unfair sentencing. Congress' goals have not been effectively
realized by the SRA. However, possible improvements to the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines include:
1. Require relevant conduct to be reyealed to the defendant and
the court during pre-trial discovery, and no later than the guilty plea or
trial. Without this information, defendants cannot make sound decisions
and their counsel cannot offer sound advice.
2. Allow judges to prevent prosecutors from bringing minimal
charges in the indictment and then seeking to dramatically enhance
sentences at the sentencing hearing through departures.
3. Allow judges to have a larger role in determining whether or
not a sentence reduction is appropriate based upon cooperation. Also, if
substantial assistance motions remain part of the Sentencing Guidelines,
there should be consistency within the Department of Justice on when
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4. Because of the substantial impact of post-conviction proceed-
ings, the Federal Rules of Evidence should apply in full, statements of
disputed facts should not be accepted by the court without the defen-
dant having the right to confront the witnesses offering such facts, and
the standard of proof should be increased to a clear and convincing
standard to adequately reflect the impact of the Sentencing Guidelines.
It is only with such changes, and perhaps others, that the federal
sentencing scheme will start to accomplish what Congress intended.
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